The Conversation: Colors are objective, according to two philosophers, even though the blue you see doesn’t match what I see.

This Element offers an opinionated and selective introduction to philosophical issues concerning the metaphysics of color. The opinion defended is that colors are objective features of our world; objects are colored, and they have those colors independent of how they are experienced. It is a minority opinion. Many philosophers thinking about color experience argue that perceptual variation, the fact that color experiences vary from observer to observer and from viewing condition to viewing condition, makes objectivism untenable. Many philosophers thinking about colors and science argue that colors are ontologically unnecessary; nothing to be explained requires an appeal to colors. A careful look at arguments from perceptual variation shows that those arguments are not compelling, and especially once it is clear how to individuate colors. Moreover, a careful look at scientific explanations shows that colors are explanatorily essential.

Find the book here and on Amazon.

Excited about our work being featured in Auburn University’s Expert Answers this week!

Read my newest article here:

https://iai.tv/articles/the-truths-in-physics-are-dependent-on-falsehoods-auid-2415?_auid=2020

Idealizations are ubiquitous in science. They are distortions or falsities that enter into theories, laws, models, and scientific representations. Various questions suggest themselves: What are idealizations? Why do we appeal to idealizations and how do we justify them? Are idealizations essential to physics and, if so, in what sense and for which purpose? How can idealizations provide genuine understanding? If our motivation for believing in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and quarks is that they are indispensable to our best theories, should we also believe in the existence of indispensable idealizations?

My new book, Idealizations in Physics (Cambridge University Press), sheds light on such questions and connects with issues such as epistemic justification, mathematical Platonism, scientific realism, and scientific understanding.

Special thanks to the series editor James Weatherall. Find the book here and on Amazon

Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences is published by Routledge today!

This book assembles cutting-edge scholarship on scientific understanding, scientific representation, and their delicate interplay. Featuring several articles in an engaging ‘critical conversation’ format, the volume integrates discussions about understanding and representation with perennial issues in the philosophy of science, including the nature of scientific knowledge, idealizations, scientific realism, scientific inference, and scientific progress.

It was wonderful working with all the amazing authors and my co-editors Insa Lawler and Kareem Khalifa!

You’ll find our introduction with summaries of all contributions on Philpapers.

Find the book here and on Amazon.

Excited to have been a part of the Harvard Foundations of Physics Series mini-workshop on Infinities and Idealizations in Physics alongside Patricia Palacios and Sam Fletcher.

Thanks to Jacob Barandes for organizing and make sure to see the FOP YouTube channel also.